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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF WITNESSES IN
FEDERAL GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS:
BURSEY v. UNITED STATES
Bursey v. United States1 is one of several recent cases2 defining
with greater precision the rights of federal grand jury witnesses. In-
creased litigation reflects in large part the government's extensive use
of the grand jury as an instrument systematically to investigate anti-
war activists and political dissidents.3 Current controversies challenge
the traditional image of the grand jury, a secret, freely roving in-
quiry4 by laymen, "unfettered by technical rules,"' 5 with demands
that witnesses be afforded procedural due process and other constitu-
tional protections.0
1466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972).
2E.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Gelbard v. United States, 408
U.S. 41 (1972) ; United States v. Doe, 460 F.2d 328 (1st Cir. 1972); In re Vericker, 446
F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1971).
3See Donner & Cerruti, The Grand Jury Network: How the Nixon Administration
Has Secretly Perverted a Traditional Safeguard of Individual Rights, Tnn NATioN, Jan.
3, 1972, at 5; Comment, Federal Grand Jury Investigation of Political Dissidents, 7 HAv.
Civ. RioiGts-Crv. Lim. L. REv. 432 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Grand Jury Investigation].
Grand jury investigations have been given enhanced status and power by the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, which provides, among other things, for special
grand juries called periodically in all major urban areas, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3331-34 (Supp.
1972), for vastly enlarged immunity grants, id. §§ 6001-03, and for lower standards
of proof for perjury, id. § 1623. Discussions of sections of the Act may be found in
SENATE Comm. oN Tm JuDicRY, ORcAmEazD Cmrm CONTRoL AcT or 1969, S. REP. No.
617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2-13, 47-59 (1969) [hereinafter cited as SENATrE REPoRTJ; 116
CONG. REc. 962, 969 (1970) (remarks of Senators Cooper and Hruska); U.S. CoD.
CoNG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4014-24 (1970). Although the congressional record is devoted
almost entirely to discussing the application of these provisions to combat organized
crime, in practice they have been used to investigate black, anti-war, and radical activist
groups. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1972, at 5, col. 1; id., Sept. 2, 1972, at 21, col. 8.
4 Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 65
(1906).
5 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956).
6The response of courts to claims advanced by grand jury witnesses has been
mixed. Recently, the Supreme Court held that requiring newsmen to disclose their
confidential sources to a grand jury does not, except in rare cases, abridge the first
amendment guarantee of freedom of the press. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972);
cf. Weinberg v. United States, 439 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1971) (absent unusual circum-
stances, an inhibitory effect on the first amendment right to associate will not justify a
refusal by a grand jury witness to testify). See text accompanying notes 105-13 infra.
The Supreme Court, however, has held that the fourth amendment protects a grand jury
witness from answering questions based on illegal wiretapping of the witness' communica-
tion. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972). But cf. Cali v. United States, 464
F.2d 475 (1st Cir. 1972) (grand jury witness not entitled to suppress illegally seized
evidence). The ability of the government to grant "use and derivative use" immunity,
rather than "transactional" immunity, in order to compel testimony from a witness who
claims his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination has been upheld. Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). See In re Vericker, 446 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1971);
Carter v. United States, 417 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 935 (1970);
In re Grand Jury Investigation of Giancana, 352 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 959 (1965). Although a grand jury witness has no right to have a lawyer present
while he testifies before a grand jury, witnesses have been permitted to consult with
counsel outside the grand jury room, but during the proceeding. Cf. United States v.
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Structurally, the grand jury functions within, and ultimately sub-
ject to, the judiciary, even though its role is both investigatory and
accusatory 7 Generally deferring to the independence of the grand
jury and the secrecy of its proceedings, not until recently have courts
intruded into the grand jury room to protect the individual rights of
witnessesY However, "[i]t is the court's process which summons the
witness to attend and give testimony, and it is the court which must
compel a witness to testify if, after appearing, he refuses to do so. °10
This considerable power gives a court the opportunity to oversee and
supervise grand juries. It may compel witnesses to testify (or hold
them in contempt for not doing so) or may not, if it perceives they
are in need of constitutional protection.
Capitalizing on this power to compel process, the Bursey court,
in an opinion by Judge Shirley Hufstedler, examined the scope of the
rights of grand jury witnesses in three situations: when a prior grant
of immunity is insufficient to protect a witness' fifth amendment privi-
lege against compulsory self-incrimination; when "concepts of funda-
mental fairness inherent in due process require"" disclosure to a
witness of his own grand jury testimony; and when a witness may
invoke first amendment protections. Because it resolved each of these
issues favorably to the grand jury witnesses, the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion represents an unparalleled attempt to provide procedural and
substantive constitutional safeguards in grand jury proceedings. In
doing so, the court infused new strength into its supervisory role over
the grand jury. Nevertheless, citizens appearing before grand juries,
whether as defendants or as witnesses, still do not possess the constitu-
tional protection they have before other arms of the government.
I
In 1969-1970 Sherrie Bursey and Brenda Joyce Presley were
members of the staff of The Black Panther, a weekly newspaper pub-
Corallo, 413 F.2d 1306, 1330 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 396 U.S. 578 (1969). See generally
Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 Mcr. L. REv. 455 (1965) ; Friendly, The Fifth Amend-
ment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. Cnx. L. REv. 671 (1968);
Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA. L. REv. 668
(1962); Steele, Right to Counsel at the Grand Jury Stage of Prosecution, 36 Mo. L. REv.
193 (1971); Note, Immunity Statutes and the Constitution, 68 CoLrst.. L. REv. 959
(1968); Note, Discovery by a Criminal Defendant of his own Grand-Jury Testimony,
68 Coumr. L. REv. 311 (1968); Grand Jury Investigation, supra note 3; Comment,
43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 194 (1968); Comment, Electronic Surveillance of the Grand Jury
Witness, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 546 (1972); Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity
Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L. 3. 1568
(1963).
7See F. W.RTON, CRnumNAL LAW AND PRoCEDURE, §§ 1685, 1709-10 (Anderson ed.
1957).
8 For a discussion of the historic role of the grand jury, see Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 59-60 (1906); In re Russo, 448 F.2d 369, 372-73 (9th Cir. 1972).
0 Grand Jury Investigation, supra note 3, at 453-54.
lOBrown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959).
11466 F.2d at 1080.
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lished by the Black Panther Party. During this period the paper
printed a nationally reported and televised speech by David Hilliard,
Chief of Staff for the Black Panther Party, containing the phrase,
"We will kill Richard Nixon." Two subsequent issues of the paper
reprinted the speech. Five months later, the paper published an article
by Eldridge Cleaver directed "To My Black Brothers in Vietnam"
urging them in highly charged language to "quit the Army now or
start destroying it from within.
M 2
A federal grand jury in the Northern District of California began
investigating these publications and other activities of the Panthers
as possible violations of federal laws generally prohibiting conspiracy,
threats against the President, and interference with the armed forces. 8
Between December 10, 1969, and September 10, 1970, Bursey was
called to testify before the grand jury five times, Presley six. Numer-
ous questions were posed to them regarding aspects of the news-
paper's production, distribution and personnel, their own life styles,
the identities of various party and newspaper staff members, and the
financial structure of the party and the paper.'
Upon appellants' refusal to answer several of the questions, an
application pursuant to section 2514 of the federal criminal code' 5
was filed, requesting immunity for the two witnesses with regard to
the grand jury's investigation. Following a hearing, immunity was
granted and the witnesses were ordered to answer a specific list of
questions. Their fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
now unavailing, the witnesses claimed a first amendment journalist's
privilege of the type that had been granted to reporter Earl Cald-
well. 6 They were found to so qualify, and a protective order issued
until and unless the grand jury should show a "compelling and over-
riding national interest" requiring their testimony. Such interest was
subsequently demonstrated to the district court, which ordered Bursey
and Presley to answer the previous questions and additionally all
other questions relevant to the grand jury's investigation.'7
When appellants were again questioned, both replied responsively
12 Id. at 1065-67.
131d. at 1065-66. Under investigation originally were possible violations of 18
U.S.C. § 2 (1970) (aiding and abetting), id. § 371 (conspiracy), and id. § 871 (threats
against the President). The inquiry subsequently extended into areas covered by id.
§ 1751 (assassination, kidnapping, and assault of the President) and id. § 2387 (inter-
ference with armed forces). 466 F.2d at 1065-66.
14466 F.2d at 1068-71.
15 18 U.S.C. § 2514 (1970) has been repealed by the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 227(a), 84 Stat. 930, effective four years after the effective
date of the Act, which occurred 60 days after its enactment. Id. § 260, 84 Stat. 931-32.
It will be replaced by 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
16 Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). In Bursey the witnesses did not directly rely
on Caldwell but confronted the court with a different, although analogous, first amend-
ment claim. See text accompanying notes 82-88 infra.
17 In re Grand jury Witnesses, 322 F. Supp. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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to a great number of questions but refused to answer several others.
At the ensuing contempt hearing, the district court held that all ques-
tions were relevant to the investigation and that none of the witnesses'
constitutional objections were worthy. They were ordered to answer,
and upon their continued refusal to respond, found in contempt.'8
The witnesses appealed the contempt conviction, challenging the pro-
priety of the original immunity grant and questioning the constitution-
ality of the final order to testify.
II
The court first confronted the question of the proper scope of
immunity authorized pursuant to section 2514. The immunity initially
granted was solely in connection with an investigation of possible
violations of the federal statute prohibiting presidential assassination,
kidnapping, and assault.19 The grand jury, however, expanded its
inquiry and sought to uncover other violations of federal law ° Be-
lieving that to respond might incriminate them for offenses for which
they had not been immunized, the witnesses refused to answer some
of the questions. The court refused to hold either that immunity goes
no further than the questions specifically presented in the court order,
or that immunity once granted extends to any and all inquiries by
the grand jury. Rather, the scope of immunity was coextensive with the
subject matter of the original grant. The burden of showing a mini-
mal standard of relevance was placed on the grand jury. If nothing
in the record "suggests a logical connection between the subject of
the question and the subject matter of the investigation," 21 then no
testimony will be judicially compelled.22
This result reasonably flows from the congressional design of
the immunity statute. Congress in enacting a predecessor of section
2 5 14 23 desired to avoid immunity grants being given too freely, thereby
18 Id.
19 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 871 (1970). See note 13 supra.
2 01d. §§ 1751, 2387. See note 13 supra. The prosecution also sought to uncover
possible violations of "related statutes," which were never identified. 466 F.2d at 1065-66.
21466 F.2d at 1076.
22 d. at 1075-76. Cited for authority in the opinion is a long list of cases, none of
which is directly on point. Later, the government argued that the court's requiring that
questions propounded by the grand jury be related to the subject matter of the immunity
grant was contrary to prior authority. Id. at 1091 (opinion on petition for rehearing
and suggestion for rehearing en banc). Although rejecting this contention, Judge
Hufstedler seemed aware of the lack of precise precedential support for her holding.
Compare id. at 1075, with id. at 1091 (treatment of Carter v. United States, 417 F.2d
384, 388 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 935 (1970)). The court, however, found
compelling the reasoning of Chief Judge Friendly in In re Vericker, 446 F.2d 244, 247-48
(2d Cir. 1971). The persuasiveness of Friendly's opinion is subject to dispute within the
Ninth Circuit itself. Compare 466 F.2d at 1091, with It re Russo, 418 F.2d 369, 372-74
(9th Cir. 1971).
23 Id. at 1073-74 n.5, 1075. The court specifically looked to Act of Aug. 20, 1954,
ch. 769, § 1, 68 Stat. 745 (formerly codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3486(c) (1964)) (repealed
1973]
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hindering future prosecution.2 4 Therefore, it was provided that the
United States Attorney must conclude that the immunity is necessary
to the public interest and additionally receive the approval of the
Attorney General before requesting the court to grant immunity 5
The grand jury was presumed to have neither a sufficiently detached
perspective nor the requisite expertise. In this scheme, it was the
court's duty to be one of "at least two other independent but inter-
ested parties who must concur in the grant of immunity.126 More-
over, section 2514 permitted immunity to be granted only for offences
specifically enumerated in section 2516.27 Although in recent years,
the federal immunity umbrella has grown to encompass more and more
offenses, 8 the basic statutory pattern remained unaltered at the time
of Bursey's contempt hearing. Because Congress limited the avail-
ability of immunity in this fashion, it was the court's task to ensure
that questions asked of the witnesses were not irrelevant to a permis-
sible grant of immunity.
2 9
Although the device of going to a judge to ascertain the scope
of immunity kept Bursey and Presley from being cited for contempt
and generally safeguards witnesses' fifth amendment rights against
self-incrimination, it does not protect against overly-broad investiga-
tions of dissident types. The court's ruling might merely encourage
applications with the conclusory language that immunity is requested
in connection with an investigation of a federal offense enumerated in
section 2516 of the federal criminal code ° Alternatively, a later filing
naming additional offenses could be submitted to the court. A minimal
increment in the procedural protection of a witness' first amendment
interests is the most that can be expected from this rule. This is not
by Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub; L. No. 91-452, § 228(a), 84 Stat. 930),
as a model for § 2514 and considered the former's legislative history persuasive.
24 H.R. REP. No. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1954).
25 Both § 2514 and § 3486(c) contain this requirement.
26466 F.2d at 1075, quoting H.R. RP. No. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1954).
27 1S U.S.C. § 2516 (1970). Section 2514 also permits immunity grants to be given
for any proceeding "involving any violation of this chapter," that is, wire interception
and interception of oral communications. Id. § 2514.
2 8Id. § 2516(1) (c). A note following § 2516 lists the offenses and the years of their
inclusion.29 The extent and scope of the court's role when hearing an immunity application
pursuant to § 2514 are not at all settled. Compare In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1250-51
(D.C. Cir. 1971); In re Vericker, 446 F.2d 244, 247-48 (2d Cir. 1971), with United
States v. Neiberger, 460 F.2d 290, 291-92 (6th Cir. 1972); In re Russo, 448 F.2d 369,
371-72 (9th Cir. 1971) (reaffirming Licata v. United States, 429 F.2d 1177 (9th Cir.),
vacated as moot, 400 U.S. 938 (1970)).
Even assuming, however, that the issuance of a § 2514 immunity order by the court
is a ministerial act, this does not mean that at a contempt hearing subsequent to the
witness' refusal to answer questions, the court may not independently determine
whether questions are related to the grant of immunity. In the latter situation, there will
most likely be more need for judicial protection, and the reasons given by the Bursey
court in support of its holding make sense.
2018 U.S.C. § 2516 (1970). Section 2516's enumeration.of federal offenses will no
longer be relevant for purposes of obtaining an immunity grant when § 2514's repeal
becomes effective. Note 15 supra.
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a great gain3 especially when weighed against the danger of broadly-
worded affidavits and further delays caused by additional hearings.
Although the court's statutory interpretation of section 2514 and
its earlier version is perhaps correct as of the time of their enactment,
unfortunately it will not stand up over time. It seems incongruous to
be bound by Congress' intent when it enacted the predecessor of
section 2514,32 because at present both of these sections have been
repealed. Section 6003, 83 granting only "use and derivative use" im-
munity, will become effective in December, 1974 and "for the first
time provide for compelling testimony in proceedings involving any
violation of federal law."13 4 Moreover, it makes clear that the court
has no discretion to deny an immunity application. 5 While the United
States Attorney will still be obligated to itemize for the court the of-
fenses for which he seeks immunity, given his absolute discretion and
the fact that the statute encompasses all federal offenses, nothing
prevents him from submitting an exhaustive list of crimes in connec-
tion with which a witness can be forced to testify.
The attempt in Bursey to confine through statutory interpreta-
tion the compulsion of testimony under a grant of immunity to "the
subject matter for which [the witness] has been immunized"38 seems
a vain assertion of judicial authority in the face of recent, and antag-
onistic, congressional action.
III
Secondly, the court attempted to cure some of the unfairness
inherent whenever a grand jury repetitively asks the same or similar
questions 7 In such a situation, it was held, no contempt order for
refusal to answer will be sustained unless the witness has been per-
mitted to inspect his prior testimony, if recorded. Should the grand
jury, however, meet its substantial burden of showing that exceptional
circumstances warrant secrecy, then disclosure will be limited to an
S1It should be noted, however, that as immunity is broadened with expanded
questioning so is the witness' fifth amendment privilege. Indeed some grand jury wit-
nesses might enjoy and desire as extensive an immunity grant as possible.
82 See note 22 supra.
83 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1970). See note 15 supra.
34 SEATE CoMM. ON TH JUoIcmRxy, ORGAxiZ C= CONTROL ACT Or 1969,
S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1969) (comments of Department of Justice).
35 "The court's role in granting the order is merely to find the facts on which the
order is predicated." H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1970). Compare 18
U.S.C. § 6003(a) (1970), uith id. § 2514 (repealed, effective Dec. 1974, by the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 227(a), 84 Stat. 930).
80 466 F.2d at 1076.
37The Ninth Circuit also reversed that part of the contempt order based upon
Bursey's refusal to answer questions that had been originally excepted by the district
court from the immunity application. It was clear to the court that the concept of due
process gave the witness the right to rely upon an earlier exception in the immunity
grant, until the "reversal of that order . . . has been brought to the witness' attention
with unmistakable clarity." Id. at 1081.
19731
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in camera inspection. At this juncture, "if it appears that the witness,
in substance, may have answered the questions for which compulsory
process is sought, the court must disclose such passages in the prior
testimony to the witness and his counsel." 38 The witness could then
avert a contempt citation by either repeating his former testimony
or calling it to the grand jury's attention3 9
To reach this result the court balanced the interests of the grand
jury against adverse effects on the witnesses. Repetitively asked ques-
tions cannot produce any significant amount of information not already
possessed by a grand jury. Of course any investigatory body has a
legitimate need to examine a witness' demeanor and consistency in
answering. This is not to say, however, that questions can be repeated
without limit. "Excessive repetition . . . needlessly prolongs an in-
vestigation, and it may permit abuse of the witness.140 A witness
would then be exposed to the potential risks of perjury or of inad-
vertently waiving his first or fifth amendment rights, especially when,
as in Bursey, the interrogations are separated by months of time.41
The court's approach is consistent with the "growing realization
that disclosure, rather than suppression, of relevant materials ordi-
narily promotes the proper administration of justice.14' Although
"wholesale"' disclosure of grand jury testimony has not been toler-
ated, on recognized occasions, when reasons for secrecy are nonex-
istent, disclosure is appropriate. 44
On balance, this is such an occasion. Four principal reasons for
grand jury secrecy are traditionally set forth:
(1) To prevent the accused from escaping before he is
indicted and arrested or from tampering with the witnesses
3
8 Id. at 1080.
89The procedure adopted by the court was modelled after FED. R. Caim. P. 16(a),
which authorizes a court to permit a defendant access to his own recorded grand jury
testimony. In United States v. Projansky, 44 F.R.D. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the court
held that rule 16(a) conferred a nearly automatic right of the defendant to his own
testimony, and that this testimony should be routinely available to the defendant, absent
a showing of need for secrecy by the government. Accord, United States v. Manetti,
323 F. Supp. 683 (D. Del. 1971); see ABA SPECiAL Comm'a. oN FEDERAL RuLEs Op
PRCocnuE, 38 F.R.D. 95, 106 (1965).
40466 F.2d at 1079.
41 Id. at 1079-80.
42 Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 870 (1966).
43 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958).
44 Some of the recognized exceptions are the following: Dennis v. United States,
384 U.S. 855 (1966) (impeachment purposes at trial); United States v. Thoreson, 428
F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1970) (witness expecting later to be a defendant in a grand jury
proceeding may have his testimony recorded); Cargill v. United States, 381 F.2d 849
(loth Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1041 (1968) (disclosure proper when defendant
prosecuted for perjury); United States v. Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1967)
(defendants as a matter of circuit court rule are entitled to the grand jury testimony
of all witnesses called at trial, absent unusual circumstances) ; United States v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 288 F. Supp. 701 (W.D. Pa. 1968) (government
witness may refresh his memory from his testimony before the grand jury); United
States v. Rosenberg, 39 F.R.D. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (perjury).
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against him. (2) To prevent disclosure of derogatory informa-
tion presented to the grand jury against an accused who has
not been indicted. (3) To encourage complainants and wit-
nesses to come before the grand jury and speak freely without
fear that their testimony will be made public thereby subject-
ing them to possible discomfort or retaliation. (4) To encour-
age the grand jurors to engage in uninhibited investigation
and deliberation by barring disclosure of their votes and
comments during the proceedings.4
Disclosure of questions propounded arguably could tip off potential
defendants who then could escape or tamper with witnesses. Ordinarily,
however, a witness before the grand jury is under no obligation of
secrecy.46 If a future accused is a friend, the witness could warn him
with or without the transcript. If, on the other hand, the accused is a
person who might harm the witness, there is no reason to suppose a
witness would act so adversely to his own interest as to reveal his
knowledge of this man's identity, whether or not a transcript were
available. Likewise, a name mentioned during the proceedings could
conceivably implicate an innocent person. Once again, a witness is
free to mention this person's name, even without a transcript.47 Dis-
closure will not prevent witnesses from speaking more openly, because,
in this situation, they have already answered identical questions and
simply desire to avoid commiting perjury. No request was made for
access to the grand jury's deliberations or voting.4 Anything revealing
a sensitive topic or embarrassing to the jurors could always be excised
from the record during an in camera hearing. There is no reason not
to allow the grand jury witness access to his own testimony when the
justifications for secrecy do not stand up. This result is especially
compelling if the suggestion by Wigmore is accepted that the beneficiary
of the rule of secrecy was intended to be the witness himself.49 It is
nonsensical to apply any rule to the detriment of its intended benefi-
ciary.
The advantages of a witness' having a copy of his own grand jury
testimony are considerable,50 and extend beyond avoiding repetitive
45 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 405 (1959) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
46FED. R. CpMr. P. 6(e) binds every participant in grand jury proceedings to
secrecy except the witness by stating "[n]o obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon
any person except in accordance with this rule." Id. The note prepared by the Advisory
Committee on Rules following rule 6 is more specific: "(2) The rule does not impose
any obligation of secrecy on witnesses."
47 Cf. In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564, 572 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
48 In no event can there be disclosure of the grand jury's deliberation or of its
votes, as these are not even revealed to the government. FED. R. CamJ. P. 6(e).
49 8 J. WIGmoRE, EvsNacE § 2362 (McNaughton ed. 1961).
6o See Grand Jury Investigation, supra note 3, at 473-94. It should be mentioned
that some witnesses may not desire their testimony to be transcribed, because without
a written record of what they said, they could not later be prosecuted for perjury
as a result of inconsistent in-court statements.
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questioning. A witness could correct errors which inevitably arise
through transcription.5' If a witness knew with reasonable certainty
that he might later be indicted,52 a copy of his testimony would help
his attorney prepare for trial.53 In situations in which the grand jury's
investigation advances into topics not enumerated in an immunity
application, the transcript will be an essential element in a later court
determination whether a witness' testimony was immunized.54
The court's opinion, however, did not analyze the problem so
broadly, but rather focused on the narrower issue of repetitive question-
ing. Without explicitly doing so, the court seemed to require a showing
of particularized need,55 by presuming that being repeatedly asked the
same questions demonstrated that need. Bursey, then, would permit
witnesses access to their testimony in a limited number of cases and
only when a contempt citation was sought. In re Russo56 presented a
somewhat similar factual situation but offered a less restrictive ap-
proach to disclosure. Russo, previously adjudged guilty of contempt
for refusing to answer a grand jury's questions,sr promised to testify
further before the grand jury if he would be allowed a copy of his
earlier grand jury testimony. Analyzing the reasons for grand jury
secrecy, 8 the court could "conceive of no reason why furnishing a
witness a written transcript of his testimony should interfere with the
valid functions of the grand jury.159 Because the rationale for grand
jury secrecy in substantial part was bottomed on the need to protect
witnesses, it was senseless to require from a witness a showing of
51 Cf. In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564, 571-72 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
52 This raises the question whether it is ever proper to call as a witness before the
grand jury a person who will most likely be a defendant. Compare Jones v. United
States, 342 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (en banc), with United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d
113, 116 (2d Cir.) (Frank, '., concurring), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955).
58E.g., United States v. Thoreson, 428 F.2d 654, 666 (9th Cir. 1970); cf. lit re
Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564, 571 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
54As the new immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970), takes complete effect,
this protection should not be undervalued. In a prosecution subsequent to the time when
testimony was compelled after a grant of "use and derivative use" immunity,
'[o]nce a defendant demonstrates that he has testified, under a state grant of
immunity, to matters related to the federal prosecution, the federal authorities
have the burden of showing that their evidence is not tainted by establishing
that they had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence.
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972), quoting Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 n.18 (1964). For a witness later to make this liminal demonstra-
tion it is essential that he have access to his grand jury testimony.
55 1n treating the problem in this manner, the court may have been influenced by
the requirement that a defendant must show "particularized need" for discovery of his
grand jury testimony, a requirement established in United States v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958), and Pittsburg Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S.
395, 400 (1959). Although the standard was somewhat liberalized in Dennis v. United
States, 384 U.S. 855, 872-73 (1966), it remains for most federal courts the accepted
norm. Boudin, The Federal Grand Jury, 61 GEo. L.J. 1, 30-34 (1972).
5653 F.R.D. 564 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
57 1n re Russo, 448 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1971).
5853 F.R.D. at 568-72. The court's analysis was substantially similar to that
presented at text accompanying notes 45-49 supra.
59 Id. at 571.
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particularized need." "He must show only that his testimony was re-
corded and a transcript can be made."' 1 Nevertheless, a contempt pro-
ceeding remains as essential to trigger the court's supervisory power. 2
Substantial procedural and substantive obstacles still confront the
witness. Because no circuit requires grand jury testimony to be re-
corded, a witness would before testifying need to bring a motion forc-
ing the grand jury to transcribe its proceedings. In the event his
transcript was necessary to defend a later contempt charge, he would
have to make another motion to grant access to the transcript. Under
Bursey, only if the witness demonstrated that the questioning offended
the notion of fundamental fairness inherent in the due process clause
would he prevail.
Arguments against secrecy and in favor of disclosure apply beyond
the facts in either Bursey or Russo and indicate that a grand jury wit-
ness, absent a showing by the government that secrecy is required for
reasons of national security,' should always be granted access to his
testimony. Implicit in such a proposal is the requirement that all grand
jury proceedings must be recorded and transcribed. Mandatory tran-
scription, although neither compelled by the Constitution,64 by statute, 5
or by court rule,"" has long been considered the better practice.67 In-
deed, twice the American Bar Association's Special Committee on
Federal Rules of Procedure has recommended its adoption.68 States
which prescribe mandatory transcription"0 do not seem to have grand
juries which operate any less effectively. 0 Reasons given in support of
6oId. at 572-73 (discussing United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677,
682 (1958)).
61 Id.
62 Because the court simply held that the witness was purged of civil contempt by
his promise to testify if furnished with a transcript, it avoided the necessity of interpreting
the language of FED. X CRm. P. 6(e), which states that a court can order disclosure
"preliminary to or in connection with a judicial proceeding." 53 F.R.D. at 572.
63 In such a situation, the accommodation tendered by the Bursey court of an in
camera inspection with limited disclosure should be implemented, if warranted. See text
accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
04 E.g., Schlinsky v. United States, 379 F.2d 735, 740 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 920 (1967); United States v. Cianchetti, 315 F.2d 584, 591-92 (2d Cir. 1963);
cf. McCaffrey v. United States, 372 F.2d 482, 484 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S.
945 (1967); Welch v. United States, 371 F.2d 287, 294 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
957 (1966).
65 Cf. FED. R. CamT. P. 6(d) states that "a stenographer or operator of a recording
device may be present while grand jury is in session," clearly implying that one need not
be present, and that therefore transcription is within the court's discretion.
66E.g., United States v. Aloisio, 440 F.2d 705, 708 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 814 (1971) (collecting cases).
67 Compare United States v. Cramer, 447 F.2d 210, 213-14 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1024 (1972), with id. at 221 & n.1 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
68 ABA SPEcIAL Comm!. ON FEDERAL RuLEs OF PROCEDURE, REPORT, APmDc, 52
F.R.D. 87, 94-95 (1971); id., 38 F.R.D. 95, 106 (1965).
69E.g., CALF. PENAL CODE § 938.1 (West Supp. 1972); IoWA CODE ANN. § 772.4
(1950); Ky. REV. STAT. § 5.16 (1969); Mnm. STAT. ANr. § 628.04 (1947).
70 Calldns, Grand Jury Secrbcy, 63 Mxci. L. REv. 455, 466 n.42 (1965); 48 CALi'. L.
REv. 160, 161-62 (1960). See generally Kennedy & Briggs, Historical and Legal Aspects of
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mandatory transcription, however, emphasize the benefits to the defen-
dant, not the witness7 1 Once a transcript has been made, the related
arguments in support of allowing witnesses access to their own testi-
mony should prevail."2 California now makes public, subject to certain
limitations, transcripts of grand jury proceedings seemingly without
hindering its purpose of discovering criminal activity.7 3 Because the
gain in procedural fairness far outweighs any loss in grand jury effec-
tiveness,74 the federal circuit courts should by rule require mandatory
transcription and recordation of grand jury proceedings 7 5 Because the
reasons for secrecy are inapposite whenever a grand jury witness seeks
a copy of his own testimony, courts should permit him access to it,
absent countervailing interests of national security.
IV
Finally, society's need for effective grand juries was balanced
against their alleged infringement of witnesses' and the public's first
amendment liberties. The precise issue before the court was whether
two grand jury witnesses, members of the staff of the official newspaper
of the Black Panther Party, could be compelled to answer questions
basically concerning the identities of members and the operations of
both the newspaper and the party in connection with a grand jury
investigation into possible crimes related to or growing out of a speech
by David Hilliard, a leader of the Black Panther Party.
The Government first contended that the first amendment did not
protect the witnesses' refusals to testify because they were connected
with threats to the President and calls for disloyalty in the armed forces,
both of which were conduct, not speech. 7 However, the issue whether
Billiard's speech, Cleaver's article, or any actions related to them fell
within the relevant statutory proscription requiring specific intent, was
precisely the subject of the grand jury's inquiry. The Government had
assumed the conclusion and this logical inconsistency in its position
justified the court's rejecting it. Moreover, the Government advanced
from the incorrect presumption that expressions are not protected, un-
less proved otherwise; the burden is on the state to show that any
possibly criminal activities were outside the first amendment's protec-
the California Grand Jury System, 43 CALin. L. Rav. 251 (1955); Louisell, Criminal
Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CMj. L. REv. 56 (1961).
71 E .g., United States v. Cramer, 447 F.2d 210, 221 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1024 (1972) (Oakes, J., dissenting).
7 2 See text accompanying notes 50-60 supra.
73 CALis. PENAL CODE § 938.1(b) (West Supp. 1972).
74 Cf. United States v. Gramolini, 301 F. Supp. 39, 41-42 (D.R.I. 1969).
75 Cf. United States v. Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365, 369-70 (2d Cir. 1967) (prospective
rule that in all cases, absent a threat to national security interests defendants are per-
mitted as a matter of right to examine the grand jury testimony of witnesses who testify
at trial).
76466 F.2d at 1081-82.
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tion. Placing this burden of proof on the government is consistent with
past precedents71 and recognizes the importance of first amendment
values in a free society.78
Next, it was argued the first amendment did not apply in the grand
jury room. 79 No reason or precedent ° supported such an argument.
Constitutional safeguards exist to protect citizens from unwarranted
governmental intrusions in whatever form they take. The correct ques-
tion was the proper accommodation, given the role of the grand jury in
our jurisprudence, between the government's need for information and
any inhibitory effects on the exercise of first amendment rights. The
court looked to judicial standards enunciated in the context of legisla-
tive investigation cases for help in harmonizing the conflicting interests
before it.8 In those cases, the Government had the burden of showing
an "immediate, substantial, and subordinating" interest in the subject
matter under investigation and a substantial connection between it and
the information sought. Moreover, it must demonstrate that there exist
no less drastic means of achieving valid governmental goals. Finally,
the government must conduct a "step by step" investigation, laying as
it advances an adequate foundation for its questions.
Such a test was demanded for witnesses before a grand jury, the
court reasoned, because of the interests of a free press, threatened by
questions delving into the affairs of the newspaper. A free press, vital
to a democratic society, must have the freedom "to decide what to print
and to distribute what is printed."'82 Essential, also, is the right to
publish anonymously. Additionally, the exercise of associational rights,83
not only by the two litigants but by all those who might affiliate with the
groups in question, was constrained by questions designed to educe the
77 Id. at 1083. The court relied on the following cases: In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23
(1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); DeGregory v. Attorney
General, 383 U.S. 825 (1966); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
78 E.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963); Bates v. City of
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 359 U.S. 449, 461 (1958).
79 466 F.2d at 1082.
8oTo the contrary, the Supreme Court has expressly recognized that the first amend-
ment is not nugatory in grand jury proceedings: "We do not expect courts will forget
that grand juries must operate within the limits of the First Amendment as well as the
Fifth." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708 (1972) (plurality opinion).
81466 F.2d at 1083. The court looked specifically at Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 551, 557 (1963) and Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
487-90 (1960), for guidance in devising an appropriate standard. See text accompanying
notes 91-98 infra.
82 d. at 1084-85.
83 The question whether associational interests, standing alone, could ever outweigh
the legitimate interests of the grand jury in investigating criminal conduct has never been
squarely decided. In United States v. Weinberg, 439 F.2d 743, 747-48 (9th Cir. 1971),
the court, under the facts of that case which involved only the future chilling effect on the
witnesses' right of associational privacy, struck a balance against the first amendment.
The court, however, did leave open the limited possibility that "unusual circumstances,"
such as those in Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub
norn., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), might justify upholding a witness'
refusal to testify where first amendment interests were threatened. See 466 F.2d at 1082
n.15.
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identity of the witnesses' newspaper colleagues and of Black Panther
Party members.
By quoting extensively from Talley v. California,8 the opinion
appeared to place its greatest reliance on the need to publish anony-
mously. In Talley the Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance forbid-
ding the distribution of handbills unless the names and addresses of
the authors, printers, publishers, and distributors were printed on them
because the ordinance's application was broader than necessary to
achieve any valid governmental objective.85 Under those circumstances,
the Court held that requiring the disclosure of the identities of the
pamphleteers would inhibit the freedom to distribute information. The
opinion continued and proclaimed in sweeping terms that the ability to
publish anonymously was essential to a free society. The repressive
effect in Talley was largely due to the fact that the governmental action
in question was an ordinance, which broadly prevented groups from
informing the public through the medium of handbills of their ideas.
A particularized grand jury investigation into possible crimes
which demanded the identities of members of a group would at first
blush seem to affect in a less stifling fashion the freedom to publish
anonymously. There is, however, an additional first amendment interest
more threatened in Bursey than in Talley. Closely linked to the freedom
to publish anonymously are first amendment associational interests.86
Groups with a need to publish anonymously are usually those espousing
unpopular, minority beliefs. To ask them to reveal their membership
might cause them to lose old members and fail to attract new ones for
fear of private reprisals or government harassment. 87 The concept 'of
liberty includes within it the right of citizens to affiliate with each other
for the purpose of disseminating ideas. Protecting privacy of association
is essential to ensure that the exercise of this right will not be deterred.8
Disclosure to the grand jury has more of an inhibitory effect than a
Talley ordinance because in the latter case no names would be revealed
84362 U.S. 60 (1960).
85 The Supreme Court rejected California's argument that the ordinance was
necessary to prevent fraud, false advertising, and slander by noting that those evils could
be directly prohibited. Id. at 64.
86 The court found support for its analysis in a series of cases dealing with various
legislative attempts to obtain information about the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People and other similar groups. Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960);
Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958).
87 A significant part of the chilling effect perceived in Gibson and NAACP v. Alabama
was the threat of private reprisals once the information was in the government's hands.
The fact that the issue of private reprisals was not raised in Bursey, however, does not
settle the question whether the first amendment interests need protection. Cf. NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958). Possession by the government of information about
a group is usually sufficient to inhibit the exercise of first amendment rights. See text
accompanying note 92 infra.
88 E.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
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until the group used handbills to communicate to the public. Although
the group might be less effective, it could continue other activities with-
out governmental interference or supervision, and if it chose to take the
risk, could even distribute handbills without complying with the ordi-
nance. Additionally, the entire membership list would not be in the
government's hands. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found that even
this amount of disclosure was too high a price for the government to
exact, absent a convincing justification, for the exercise of constitu-
tional rights. If the government prevailed in Bursey, the occasion of
grand jury questioning would grant the government access to the
identities of all persons on the newspaper staff and of the Black Panther
Party.
Looking to the government's interest, it goes without saying that
the state has a compelling interest in detecting crime through the grand
jury. However, merely to assert the proposition ought not to be enough
to outweigh the burden on first amendment rights caused by certain
questioning. The protection of the first amendment interests by the
test formulated in Bursey should only be rejected if the loss in the
grand jury's effectiveness, operating with the test, is substantial.89
Without the test the grand jury would surely receive answers to its
questions more rapidly, thereby gaining efficiency. But it would have
in its possession no more information, useful to its investigation, than
it could have obtained pursuant to the Bursey test, because if the
information is useful, then one may safely assume that the grand jury
could have made the necessary showing. Although information sought
may be useful for purposes not germane to the specific investigation,
receiving such information in this manner is not a governmental interest
worthy of protection."
The Ninth Circuit did not question whether the test from the
legislative investigation cases was appropriate for grand juries. Although
both are governmental investigative bodies, they differ in how they
perform that function.91 First, legislative committees investigate pub-
licly while grand juries proceed in secrecy. Public exposure was thought
to be a major source of the legislative committee's inhibitory effect on
first amendment interests.92 Answering this argument, Judge Hufstedler
reasoned that, under the facts in Bursey, the government's possession
of information similarly chilled the witnesses' first amendment rights.
Those circumstances involved a minority political party and its official
newspaper, both strongly critical of governmental policies. What was
89 See generally Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALPE L.J.
464 (1969).
90 Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700 (1972), quoting DeGregory v. Attorney
General, 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966).
91 See Grand Jury Investigation, supra note 3, at 477-81.
02 E.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1960) ; Bates v. City of Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516, 523-24 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958).
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asked was the identities of members of both associations before any
foundation existed to believe that that knowledge would assist in un-
covering a crime. The threat to first amendment interests caused by
only the government's possessing the information can be seen by
imagining that the government required this party to register on the
grounds that it was considered subversive. No one would doubt that
strong justification would be needed to legitimate such action. Absent
that strong showing, the government should not be able to achieve the
same result indirectly. Of course should the government demonstrate
that the information would help unearth a crime, the test propounded
in Bursey would grant the grand jury access to it.
The First Circuit was invited in United States v. Doe, to apply
the legislative standards to grand juries where questions abridged a
scholar's first amendment interest in gathering information 3 The court
declined to extend the analogy primarily for the reason that because
the two bodies carry out their investigating duty in different manners
and for different purposes, different standards of relevance apply. The
legislative committee test was needed to protect individuals from being
forced to answer questions too particularized to be of any aid in solv-
ing the general problem before the legislature. So that questions bear-
ing no relation to the passing of a law not be asked, the Supreme Court
required a showing of relevance to the legislative purpose. On the other
hand, a grand jury must determine "if there is probable cause to believe
that particular crimes have been committed by particular persons."
94
Because its inquiry is finer, it can legitimately expect responses to
specific, detailed questions. To ask the grand jury to make a showing of
relevancy would check its traditionally broad discretion to decide its
needs. That grand juries need flexibility does not mean that the limited
showing required by Bursey would significantly detract from that inter-
est. The court's argument, moreover, assumes its conclusion. The evil
discerned by witnesses results from grand jury investigations that are
not particularized.95 If the inquest is indeed to ascertain whether a
particular crime has been committed by particular persons then the
threat to first amendment liberties is minimal and, in the usual case,
outweighed by the substantial interest of the grand jury. It would also
appear in this situation that the burden to the government of demon-
strating relevancy is slight. On the other hand, if the grand jury is
93 460 F.2d 328, 331-32 (1st Cir. 1972).
94 Id.
95 The grand jury's traditionally broad range of inquiry means the ability to track
down every lead or hunch in connection with specific, or general, criminal activity. It
does not mean that grand juries are allowed to call witnesses with no substantial con-
nection to its stated objectives in order to ascertain political affiliations, because this
would contradict another purpose of the grand jury: "to stand between the prosecutor
and the accused, and to determine whether the charge was founded upon credible
testimony or was dictated by malice or personal ill will." Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43,
59 (1906) (expounding the traditional English doctrine).
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inquiring into the affairs of a dissident 'newspaper or political party
without really attempting to discover criminal activity, then the inter-
ests in free press and association call for protection. Only then would
it be difficult for the grand jury to make its showing.
Legislative committees, it is argued, are more susceptible to abus-
ing witnesses' rights because they, unlike grand juries, respond almost
entirely to political pressures.9" The extensive control exercised by the
prosecutor, who is invariably politically sensitive, over the grand jury
belies this assumption. The argument may cut the other way since the
ultimate political accountability of the legislature may restrain its
repressive investigations. To the extent the contention has validity, it
ought not to afford a sufficient basis to justify treating the two bodies
differently, because, politics notwithstanding, the exercise of first
amendment rights has been stifled equivalently.
The court in Doe also raised the point that even a limited showing
of relevancy would undermine the long-standing policy of grand jury
secrecy.97 Previously, we have seen that the justifications for secrecy
are not persuasive when a witness seeks access to his own testimony.
The same is true here. 8 The showing would occur only after the ques-
tions had been asked (possibly after a contempt citation), and therefore
the witness would already have a good idea what suspects the grand
jury had in mind. The testimony of other witnesses or the discussions
of grand jurors could perhaps be placed in summary form so that they
could not be recognized. Or, names could be excised from the transcript.
If necessary, the relevancy showing could be made in camera. In sum,
the arguments based on the functional differences of the two bodies
against applying the legislative investigation test to grand juries are not
persuasive.
One reason the Bursey test does not unduly hinder the grand jury's
operations is that it does not act as a substantive bar to its obtaining
information. It requires the investigation to follow a procedural path
so that questions necessary to the inquest will interfere as slightly as
possible with first amendment interests. Certainly, several individuals
could not begin publishing a newspaper, commit a crime, and when
questioned about their co-conspirators' participation remain silent be-
hind an assertion of their right to publish anonymously. 9 But this is
not what took place in Bursey. First, the existence of a crime had not
been established; that was the grand jury's task. Second, assuming a
crime had been committed, there was no indication that disclosure of
the identities of the members of the newspaper staff or of the Black
Panther Party would reveal anyone connected with the crime. The
96 Cf. Grand Jury Investigation, supra note 3, at 481.
97 460 F.2d at 332.
98466 F.2d at 1091-92 (opinion on petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehear-
ing en banc).
99 Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 nA0 (1972) (plurality opinion).
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Ninth Circuit's test did not thwart the grand jury's objectives but
simply stopped it from encroaching upon first amendment interests
until and unless it was proven necessary. In this respect the opinion
imposes less of a constraint on governmental activity than the invalida-
tion of the ordinance in Talley.10 If the grand jury showed "that there
is a substantial possibility that the information sought will expose
criminal activity"' 0'1 on the part of the members of the group, then the
questions would have to be answered.
Applying its test to the facts before it, 02 the court had little diffi-
culty finding a substantial governmental interest in investigating pos-
sible plots to assassinate the President or to interfere with the armed
forces. More refined analysis, however, was required to determine, as
the government argued, whether valid governmental objectives out-
weighed the first amendment interests threatened by the grand jury's
questions. For this purpose, questions asked of Bursey and Presley
were separated into four groups. Queries intended to discover more
about the leaders of the Panther Party and its connection with foreign
governments were first considered. In order to investigate whether
illegal conspiracies existed, the grand jury needed to ascertain whether
the "We will kill Richard Nixon" speech had meaning or was merely
rhetorical. To this end it could proceed a step at a time by asking
preliminary questions to unearth the identities of those on the Panther
Central Committee with whom Hilliard was most likely to have been
in contact. The court was also unprepared to say that, if a plot existed,
foreign governments would not have been involved. Consequently,
eliciting information about possible ties between the Panthers and
foreign governments was not impermissible.
In contrast, no legitimate foundation was found for the grand
jury's questions about the production and distribution of the Panther
newspaper and pamphlets and the identities of those responsible for
them. The court began by noting the theories under which the printers,
publishers, and distributors of Hilliard's speech and Cleaver's article
could be held guilty.
(1) the act of printing, publishing, or distributing these
materials was itself criminal, (2) the printers, publishers,
and distributors were the "we" to whom Hilliard referred in
his speech, and (3) the actors were directly or vicariously
responsible for Hilliard's and Cleaver's expressions which
were criminal. 3
Of these, the court focused mainly on discrediting the first. For the
act of printing Hilliard's speech to be criminal under the statutes in-
'
0 See text accompanying notes 84-88 supra.
101 466 F.2d at 1083.
102 Id. at 1086-88.
103 Id. at 1087.
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volved, those working on its publication must have possessed specific
intent. No evidence was adduced by the government to demonstrate
that the editors of the Panther paper had that specific intent, while
other newspapermen across the country carrying the same speech did
not. The government argued next that the publishers' highlighting of
the article evidenced the requisite specific intent. The court refused to
accept an inference of specific intent arising from the exercise of edi-
torial judgment by itself. If a decision as to newsworthiness could afford
a basis for grand jury investigations, virtually every domestic news-
paper could be compelled to reveal the identities of its staff members,
the paper's financing, and its inner operations. This result, the court
found, is inconsistent with the first amendment. As to the other possible
theories of criminal liability, no evidence of actions other than turning
out a newspaper was in the record, and publishing a newspaper could
not by itself be a predicate for criminal liability.
The third category contained questions seeking the names of
workers on the Panther newspaper who appeared in a magazine photo-
graph. Indirect attempts to obtain a list of members of the newspaper
staff could not succeed, absent a legitimate foundation, where direct
efforts had been forbidden by the court. Finally, broad-gauged inquiries
into the financial affairs of the newspaper and the Black Panther Party
failed, even though some information from them might be relevant to
the grand jury's inquiry, because more sharply focused questions could
have uncovered identical information without revealing other informa-
tion invading the witnesses' privacy.
The court's distinction between questions going to the existence of
an alleged plot and those seeking to discover the workings of the news-
paper is a valid one and offers a clear illustration of how legitimate and
illegitimate grand jury inquiries can be segregated. In light of the
seriousness of the possible crime, the court cannot be faulted for making
the preliminary assumption that the grand jury's investigation was
justified.'"4 Although traditionally assassins have operated somewhat
more covertly than Hilliard did in Golden Gate Park, the court prob-
ably was deferring to the United States Attorney's office and the fact
that it, not the court, initiates grand jury investigations. If the plot
were real, those most likely to be involved were the other members of
the Black Panther Central Committee, Hilliard's closest associates.
The possibility that foreign governments were aiding the Panthers in
this plot is more tenuous, but the grand jury can reasonably be per-
mitted to pose questions about this subject, because no countervailing
first amendment right of association could convincingly be invoked by
the Panthers. Although if they were financed from abroad, questions
into the nature of the sponsors could substantially harm the organiza-
1 0 4 The court expressly disclaimed any opinion as to whether or not the speech
was "a kind of crude political hyperbole." Id. at 1067 n.1.
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tion, nevertheless, this danger to the party would be outweighed by the
legitimate governmental interest in preventing foreign subversion of
the United States. However, when posing questions about the operations
of the Panther newspaper and the identity of its staff, the grand jury
was embarking on a fishing trip. No explanation was offered to justify
believing that the people associated with the paper should be the
"We" to whom Hilliard referred. Moreover, permitting these questions
could seriously damage the ability of the Panthers to publish and to
attract and retain members. When the first amendment rights of asso-
ciation and press were weighed against the highly attenuated relation-
ship between the grand jury's questions and the subject matter of the
investigation, the outcome for a court should be obvious.
That the Bursey court adopted its standard before the Supreme
Court decided Branzburg v. Hayes0 5 casts some doubt upon the viabil-
ity of the Ninth Circuit's test. Branzburg held that the first amendment
did not create a qualified privilege for newsmen by requiring that the
grand jury make a preliminary showing of need and relevancy before
they could be asked to reveal confidential sources. Judge Hufstedler
offered several reasons for rejecting the government's argument that the
rationale of Branzburg was inconsistent with Bursey's reasoning and
result."0 6 First, where the asserted constitutional interest in Branzburg
was the ability of the press effectively to gather news, Bursey involved
both the need to publish anonymously and associational interests.
Second, no claim for a preliminary showing by the grand jury was
asserted in Bursey. The limited showing asked of the government came
into operation only after an individual demonstrated his first amend-
ment rights needed protection and during a contempt hearing in court.
Third, the test did not act as a substantive bar to the grand jury's
obtaining information. It demanded simply that the questioning occur
with the minimum adverse impact on first amendment interests. Finally,
the court recognized that broad language in Branzburg might intimate
that the government's interest in grand juries, absent bad faith or
harassment, would invariably outweigh first amendment liberties. The
court, however, refused to accept this implication.
No one could argue that the constraints on first amendment inter-
ests in Bursey were not more real than the ones in Branzburg Justice
White found so speculative.' 0° Likewise, the burden on grand jury
procedure is not so great as would have been imposed by a constitu-
tional newsman privilege. The protection would be available to newsmen
and non-newsmen alike, although the existence of a press interest would
be a factor in favor of applying the test.108 Associational interests by
105408 U.S. 665 (1972).
106466 F.2d at 1090-91 (opinion on petition for rehearing and suggestion for
rehearing en banc).
107 408 U.S. at 690-95.
108 1d. at 687-90, 697-98. Justice White stressed the fact that newsmen were not
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themselves could trigger the adoption of the test in certain circum-
stances. 0 9
The crucial question remains of what, in light of the infringement
of first amendment liberties, is necessary for the grand jury in fulfilling
its valid objectives. Justice White, writing for the plurality in Branz-
burg, took an extremely liberal view of the needs of the grand jury.
It is not bound by strict standards of materiality or relevance, but is
free to conduct its broad inquiry according to its own assessment of its
need for information. Primarily on this basis the Court rejected the
qualified newsman privilege." 0
White's biased balancing also produces uncertainty with respect
to Bursey's first amendment test. Although his categorizing the first
amendment interests as speculative can be challenged,"' that is not
the real problem with his test. He incorrectly describes the govern-
mental interests at issue. To him "the investigation of crime by the
grand jury implements a fundamental governmental role of securing
the safety of the person and the property of the citizen.""' Of course
no one would quarrel with such a statement. The more precise question
is whether the government's interest in a particular means of furthering
that objective, that is, a grand jury investigation without a newsman
privilege, would be unduly threatened. The latter interpretation of the
requirements of the grand jury is not altogether at variance with the
court's resolution in Bursey. Judge Hufstedler was more concerned with
any possible loss in effectiveness suffered by the grand jury as a result
of the adoption of the proposed test. She concluded the loss was minimal.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the rationale of Branzburg
is inconsistent with the reasoning in Bursey, there are two hopes for
the survival of Bursey's first amendment holding." 3 The Supreme Court
may use a more refined balancing test when confronted with a different
claim for protecting first amendment interests during a grand jury
investigation. Instead of loosely placing on the government's side of the
equation its interest in combatting crime, it may focus more accurately
on the government's interest in pursuing that end through the means
actually at issue. Formulating the test thusly would certainly tip the
scales less favorably and artificially in favor of the government.
White's opinion in Branzburg also left open the possibility that in
certain situations the Court would require the grand jury to state its
reasons for calling reporters. This would occur only in a narrow set of
to be treated differently from ordinary citizens either with respect to their duty to give
information to the grand jury or with respect to their relationship with informers or
criminals.
109 Cf. United States v. Weinberg, 439 F.2d 743, 750 (9th Cir. 1971).
11o The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HAmv. L. REv. 50, 143 (1972).
111408 U.S. at 728-33 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 700.
11 3 Bursey has received some judicial approval. United States v. Liddy, No. 72-2210,
at 4 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 20, 1972) (per curiam) (Leventhal, J., concurring).
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circumstances when grand jury investigations were begun or conducted
in bad faith or to harass the press.114 Justice White's formulation seemed
to imply that the burden of proving the government's bad faith would
be placed on newsmen. Such a hurdle might well be insurmountable,
especially in light of White's emphasis on the grand jury's need for
flexibility in conducting its own investigation."15 Justice Powell in a
cryptic concurrence" 6 appeared to construe this "bad faith" exception
more expansively. 117 A newsman was entitled to judicial protection if
he had been
called upon to give information bearing only a remote and
tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation, or if
he has some other reason to believe that his testimony impli-
cates confidential source relationships without a legitimate
need of law enforcement.
118
Although neither articulation of the test was clear, Powell's version" 9
might give lower federal courts some leeway when confronted with
claims, similar to those in Bursey, that first amendment interests were
threatened in the course of a grand jury investigation.
114 408 U.S. at 707-08.
15 Id. at 701-02.
116 Id. at 709-10. His was the fifth vote necessary for a majority. He indicated that
it was the court's duty to balance the conflicting interests, thereby implying that neither
side would have the burden of proof. Id. at 710 n.*.
117 Cf. The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 50, 144-45 (1972).
118408 U.S. at 710.
119 In order for Powell's test to have growing power, it would be necessary not to
read narrowly his reference to "newsman," but to consider any person, whose first
amendment interests are threatened, as entitled to protection.
